Memorandum by the State Secretary - concerning Germany's relations with France and Britain
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy vol. IV, p.998.
II R 54. BERLIN, January 13, 1936
During his today's visit the French Ambassador reverted to the conversation we had held on January 10 during the New Year's reception. He repeated his Government's assurance that no agreements of any kind directed against Germany had been concluded with the British. He expatiated at length, repeating his earlier remarks, on the fact that the recent German press campaign had been very disquieting for France. It was, he said, clear that we were seeking a pretext for alleging that the Treaty of Locarno had been violated by France, or by Britain and France together, in order then to occupy the Rhineland. On this he must state most explicitly that his Government had not concluded any agreements. I interrupted the Ambassador and said that I took note of and was grateful for this statement, but that I would like to know whether there had been any discussions, either, about joint action against Germany in the Locarno contingency or otherwise. At the time of the Anglo-French Entente, that is to say in 1904, and in the subsequent years, we had had very unpleasant experiences with the British. They had made sophisticated distinctions between commitments [Bindungen], agreements [Verabredungen] and the like, and had continued to assure us that their hands were entirely free, whilst they had in fact long been in alliance with France. The Ambassador took note of these questions and said he was not in a position to reply to them. He then returned to the London Protocol of February 3, to which he, and after him, Phipps, had referred in their conversations at the end of last year with the Fuehrer and Chancellor. These conversations had been entirely negative. London and Paris were therefore justified in assuming that we did not wish to participate in international discussions. He personally would consider it not only understandable, but justifiable if in these circumstances, the States interested in these agreements were to negotiate amongst themselves. He knew nothing of this, however, and had only been instructed to make the declaration given above. He said that he was further instructed to state that his Government considered themselves entitled to conclude bilateral treaties within the framework of the Treaty of Locarno, for the application of the Treaty of Locarno, and that in the French view we were entirely free to do the same. I told the Ambassador that I must strenuously oppose this view. The treaty of Locarno did not permit bilateral agreements. Even if one were to interpret it in this sense, it would not be admissible to enter into such agreements without previously consulting the other Contracting Parties and informing them of the substance of such agreements. I then enlarged on this, saying amongst other things that what annoyed us in the Franco-Russian Treaty was the right which France arrogated to herself to interpret the Treaty of Locarno unilaterally, thereby relapsing into the Versailles mentality. I said that furthermore the British Ambassador had, as Francois-Poncet was aware, enquired whether we would approve of bilateral agreements within the framework of a possible Locarno Air Pact, to which the Fuehrer and Chancellor naturally replied in the negative. Now he [Francois-Poncet] came along and declared in the name of his Government that they considered themselves entitled to conclude supplementary agreements regarding the casus foederis , within the framework of the Treaty of Locarno, which had been in force for over ten years without having undergone any alteration, and to do so without consulting with us beforehand, or informing us of the contents of the proposed agreements. The Ambassador protested that we had concluded a Naval Agreement with Britain without consulting with the Locarno Powers either. I refused, however, to accept the comparison as valid. I then said that his interpretation of our press campaign, which I denied was an official campaign, was erroneous. It had nothing to do with any designs on the Rhineland but had been brought about by the many utterances in Britain and France which had gone uncorrected, or had been corrected tardily or ambiguously, and all of which indicated that Anglo-French agreements directed against Germany were being considered. Furthermore, official statements, such as the most recent statement by Eden also sounded extremely ambiguous and increased our mistrust rather than dispelled it. The Ambassador then proceeded to make lengthy observations, such as he had frequently made before, about Laval's intentions, his difficult position and the damage done to German-French relations by German rearmament, and added that he could only repeat that no Anglo-French agreements had been made. On the other hand he said that he could well imagine that Laval, in parrying the British expectations about action against Italy, had put the counter question of whether, should France become involved in a conflict with Germany, Britain would be prepared to render France the same support as she (Britain) was now demanding. This should, however, only be regarded as a manoeuvre and we must after all be grateful to Laval for his attitude over the Abyssinian conflict, for he had done all that was humanly possible to prevent the situation from deteriorating, Mussolini from falling and irreparable damage in general from being done. I, for my part, then turned to the London Protocol of February 3 and the conversations of November and December of last year and told the Ambassador that the French and British were always trying to make out that we had accepted the London Memorandum as a basis for discussion. This was, however, not the case. Moreover, the conversations with the Fuehrer and Chancellor had by no means proved as negative, as he, Francois-Poncet, and according to him, Sir Eric Phipps too, made out. Neither the French Government nor the British could in any way derive from the conversations a pretext for concluding or even preparing agreements without us. The Fuehrer and Chancellor in his conversations with him (French Ambassador) had insisted on our readiness for negotiations and had only pointed out that the moment was not favourable for negotiations. As had now emerged from a conversation between Eden and Hoesch, the British Ambassador had misunderstood the Chancellor. The latter had said that he was in principle in agreement with a Locarno Air Pact, which was indeed in accordance with his previous attitude; he had only rejected limitation of air armaments amongst the Locarno Powers by pointing to the Franco-Russian Alliance. The Ambassador finally requested that the press be urged to put an end to the campaign of recent weeks. Our conversation had brought up several interesting points, for instance our rejection of bilateral agreements within the framework of the Treaty of Locarno. This would have to be the subject of further diplomatic negotiations. That would only be possible if unaccompanied by loud press trumpetings. We should not over-estimate the strength of Laval's position, nor make his life and the pursuit of his international objectives harder by attacking him in the press. I told the Ambassador that it was my impression that our press campaign, which was entirely spontaneous and which reflected reports from France and Britain, had now exhausted itself. If no further incidents occurred and no fresh disquieting reports came in, it was unlikely to continue; he could therefore rest easy on this point.
